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A RESPONSE TO CRITICS OF
IN DEFENSE OF KANT’S RELIGION
Chris L. Firestone

This essay replies to four critics of In Defense of Kant’s Religion (IDKR). In
reply to Gordon E. Michalson, Jr., I argue that the best pathway for understanding Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (Religion) is to
conduct close textual analysis rather than giving up the art of interpretation
or allowing meta-considerations surrounding Kant’s personal and political circumstances to govern one’s interpretation. In response to George di
Giovanni, I contend that his critique is dismissive of theologically robust
readings of Kant for reasons that have very little to do with what Religion
actually asserts. Pamela Sue Anderson’s essay, I argue, reads Kant on God
according to an empirically-biased stream of British interpretation which
makes Kant’s transcendental philosophy appear foreign to its rationalist heritage. Lastly, in response to Stephen R. Palmquist, I suggest that his
reading of Kant’s two experiments is done not only in a vacuum, but also
according to a perspectival interpretation of Kant that goes beyond what
Kant’s writings actually maintain.

My thanks to Jamie Smith, Andrew Chignell, and the Society of Christian Philosophers for organizing the “Authors Meet Critics” session at the
American Academy of Religion (Montreal: November, 2009). I also appreciate the work of the conference panelists in both reading In Defense of
Kant’s Religion (henceforth IDKR) and engaging it in such a spirited way.
Thanks also to Gordon Michalson, whose work on Kant raised the bar
for Kant interpreters by focusing on the particulars of Religion within the
Boundaries of Mere Reason (henceforth Religion) and setting out a series of
unresolved difficulties that must be addressed if the text is to be considered a coherent work of philosophy. He was the first interpreter of Kant to
contact us after IDKR’s publication. His enthusiastic endorsement of the
book as “a marvel to behold” and as “a generous treatment of [his] own
work” as well as his personal renown as an interpreter of Kant’s Religion
led us to invite him to contribute to this set of papers.
Gordon E. Michalson, Jr.
Kant’s Religion contains an array of interpretive possibilities and navigating it well requires familiarity with both Kant’s critical corpus and the
variety of philosophical, religious, and theological concepts that inhabit
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Kant’s time. So challenging are these conditions that interpreters are often
forced down one of three unsavory pathways when dealing with the text:
(1) make a career out of interpreting Religion; (2) shift focus away from
the text toward meta-considerations surrounding it; or (3) throw in the
towel and advocate not defending the text at all. I have always understood
Michalson to start down the first pathway in his early work on Kant.1
When reading Michalson’s comments on IDKR, however, I was surprised
to find him framing his early work on Kant in a way that strikes me more
like pathways two and three. Michalson writes, “my intention has always
been to locate key issues in [Kant’s] thought that help us understand why
he is so important for grasping the trajectory of modern religious thought
in the West” (183). Throughout his remarks, he distances himself from the
role of critical interpreter of Religion, and casts himself “as the one making
the case for Kant”—that is, for his significance in Western thought—“not
as the one prosecuting him” (183).
Not surprisingly, this struck me as a shift in Michalson’s thinking, but
apparently this is how he has always thought of his work. Despite the fact
that I am one of his longtime readers, I am in no position to dispute the
claim. In fact, I find his critical essay to be both a flattering endorsement of
many of the most constructive moments in our book and a poetic tribute
to how he has come to view his own career. Concerning this second point,
however, one must acknowledge that even if Michalson has never thought
of his work in prosecutorial terms, others (in addition to the authors of
IDKR) have. For example, I remember well how Peter Byrne (external
examiner of my PhD dissertation and former distinguished editor of the
journal Religious Studies) demanded two complementary revisions to my
dissertation. The first was to deal directly with Religion in support of my
thesis that Kant’s philosophy is theologically affirmative; the second was
to deal with Michalson’s Fallen Freedom, since any adequate interpretation
of Religion must deal with the myriad of objections to its coherence found
there. Whatever else lay behind Byrne’s demand, one thing is certain: he
took Michalson’s work to be the definitive statement on Religion’s argumentative shortcomings.
I have come to agree with Byrne on this score. For my part, if I claim
that an author has written a book with incoherent arguments, I am making a kind of accusation against the book. Whether Michalson thinks of
himself as a prosecutor of Kant is irrelevant to the fact that the charges of
incoherence he has leveled against Religion are an indictment of sorts. His
reservation over being the star witness for the prosecution in IDKR is less
like someone who did not see the events that precipitated an indictment,
and more like the key witness who saw the events, had the courage to report them, but now does not want to get anyone into trouble or get himself
1
I have in mind Gordon E. Michalson, Jr., The Historical Dimensions of a Rational Faith:
The Role of History in Kant’s Religious Thought (Washington: University Press of America,
1979) and Fallen Freedom: Kant on Radical Evil and Moral Regeneration (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990).
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anymore involved. Of course, making a career out of trying to interpret
Religion (pathway one) makes little sense if you come to believe that the
text is incoherent. So I can understand why Michalson now frames his
work as definitively pursuant of pathway two and, in this essay, is now
moving on to pathway three. However, it should not be missed that a shift
in focus to the influence and complexity of Religion does not change the
fact of textual inconsistencies, which Michalson so aptly identifies in his
early work.
It also should not be missed, if IDKR is right or even just on the right
track, that indeed another promising pathway is open to interpreters of
Religion, and this fourth pathway—namely, carefully interpreting the text
by following the helpful signs and roadblocks mapped out by past interpreters—is the one actually taken in IDKR. Michalson’s comments on
IDKR, far from precluding this possibility, seem at times to endorse it. In
other words, IDKR stands as a testament to the fact that, until this new
pathway is tried and found wanting, neither of Michalson’s alternatives
will do as the pathway of choice for Kant’s readers. This realization sets
up an interesting tension in Michalson’s essay—he seems on the whole to
be pulled between pathway three (no longer defending the text) and pathway four (following the interpretative lead of Firestone and Jacobs). It will
be worth spending at least a little time to examine why.
From the outset of Michalson’s response to IDKR, we find both an
appreciation for the first half of the book and a general concern that it
obscures something significant in our authorial motivations that we are
reticent to admit. In “Part One: Perspectives on Kant’s Religion,” Jacobs
and I offer a study of the secondary literature, which culminates in a
detailed synopsis of Michalson’s criticisms of Kant’s Religion. Michalson
commends the breadth and depth of this analysis, noting that we “have
rendered the enormous service of identifying, clarifying, and evaluating
a broad spectrum of these interpretive responses to Kant’s Religion” (182).
Be this as it may, there are two things that Michalson believes this scaffolding obscures—one intentionally, the other unintentionally. While we
openly declare that this book is “not a Christian apologetic,” Michalson
suspects something lurking below the surface of our analysis. As he puts
it, “Still, the authors clearly view Kant’s work as broadly compatible with
Christianity and as a constructive moment in the history of modern Christian thought. Whatever their interpretive priorities may be, Firestone and
Jacobs have an obvious stake in this presumed compatibility” (183). The
other feature of IDKR he believes to be obscured revolves around key
interpretive contributions in Part Two, many of which are new to the field
of Kant-studies and deserving of careful consideration in their own right.
Michalson thinks that at least some of these arguments are profound, but
easily missed because of the complex nature of the first half of the book.
Jacobs, in his response to follow, explains in some detail the general
incompatibility of Kant’s philosophy with Christianity. I agree with his
position, and would direct the attention of interested readers there. We
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do not endorse, and believe we never have endorsed, Kant’s philosophy
of religion as compatible with Christianity strictly speaking. What I think
is happening here is that the terms compatibility and Christianity are being
used in more than one sense and confusing the issue. For example, in his
essay “Who is the True Kant?,” Keith Yandell does a great job of showing
the incompatibility of Kant’s philosophy with Christian doctrine.2 Yandell
does not mince words. If Kant’s expressed position on Christian doctrine
were the whole story, Kant’s philosophy could not be considered compatible with Christianity. We agree with Yandell—Kant’s specific assertions
about Christian doctrine are often incompatible with Christianity.
Two aspects of Kant’s position, however, indicate that there is a sense
in which compatibility accurately describes the relationship between
Kant’s philosophy of religion and Christianity. First, when Kant writes of
Christianity in Religion, he refers to what he calls “New Testament Christianity,” by which he means the writings of the New Testament in isolation
from historical Christian orthodoxy. Kant makes this claim in Book Four
of Religion, as we spell out in detail in chapter 8 of IDKR. We argue that
“New Testament Christianity” is the object of Kant’s second experiment
in Religion. Beginning with it as revealed religion, Kant “tests it . . . to sort
out what, and how much, it is entitled to from one source or the other”
(6:156). Kant’s principal interest in Christianity is whether his core moral
doctrines can be found in the New Testament; whether it contains doctrines beyond these core doctrines is irrelevant to Kant. He concludes
that this experiment makes clear “(1) that Christianity in its original form
bears the rational core of the pure moral doctrines as they are expounded
in the first experiment [(Books One, Two and Three of Religion)], and (2)
as such the most central Christian doctrines, propagated by Jesus, do not
depend on the Jewish scriptures. Original Christianity . . . stands instead
on rational insights of which all can be convinced simply by reason”
(IDKR, 221). This conclusion is not Firestone and Jacobs’s position, but our understanding of Kant’s position. When Christianity is thought of as what
Kant perceives to be the relevant core of “New Testament Christianity,”
he not only implies a certain compatibility with pure rational religious
faith, but also defends it explicitly.
Secondly, it is important to realize that Kant’s philosophy of religion
is not a closed system. As I have pointed out in numerous places in my
publications, the most fruitful way of approaching Kant’s philosophy of
religion is to consider as significant Kant’s distinction between the disciplines of philosophy and theology. Kant understands philosophy to be the
cognitive approach to reality constituted by the authority of reason and
freedom (7:33). Theology, of course, is different. Theology is the cognitive approach to reality constituted by the authority of God’s Word and
Spirit (7:24). Kant goes on to advocate an ongoing conflict of perspectives
between philosophy and theology. He writes, “This conflict can never
2

Keith Yandell, “Who is the True Kant?,” Philosophia Christi 9:1 (2007), 93–97.
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end, and it is the philosophy faculty that must always be prepared to
keep it going” (7:33). Kant’s notion of conflict is not one of a war but of
two different and distinct disciplinary perspectives that seek after one
and the same common end (7:35–36). What this means is that, while Kant
himself advocated a certain type of compatibility between Christian faith
and transcendental philosophy, his philosophy of religion also demands a
dialectical conflict with theology, since this conflict might serve to hasten
and awaken philosophical insight into yet-unrealized rational truths. For
Kant, this is as it should be. For the very health and vitality of philosophy
requires it.3
If compatibility with Christianity does lie beneath our arguments
in IDKR, it is these more general forms of compatibility, namely, Kant’s
“New Testament” understanding of Christianity as exemplifying the core
doctrines of rational religion and Kant’s openness to the consideration of
Christian theological truth claims as possible awakeners and hasteners
of rational truth. No specific compatibility can be claimed, however, at
least not without first doing the hard work of analyzing each theological
claim in a purely rational context, and then scrutinizing the result relative
to the confessional strictures of historical Christianity. I show how this
might be done, for example, with the Christian doctrine of the Trinity in
Kant and Theology at the Boundaries of Reason.4 What I conclude in that work
is precisely what we state in IDKR, namely, “The relationship between
Religion and Christianity is, from the Christian perspective, a mixed bag”
(IDKR, 5).
What I fear Michalson has somehow overlooked, but which we make
abundantly clear, is our relentlessly textual interpretive strategy. Our sole
concern in IDKR is textual coherence. This, to my mind, explains sufficiently the complexity of the first half of the book. Before a new interpretation such as ours can be properly understood, let alone accepted,
the critical thinker must first understand the accomplishments and the
limitations of the main alternatives. As we write in IDKR, “these interpretations and conundrums have identified promising interpretive avenues
and dead ends that have been met with when navigating this classic work.
Without these charts and navigational tools to mark out the rocks that
have shipwrecked many interpretations, navigating the treacherous seas
of Kant’s philosophy of religion would be nearly impossible” (IDKR, 235).
In other words, the survey of the secondary literature conducted in the
first half of the book is not only helpful for readers trying to understand
why one should go our way and not some other way, but also necessary to
appreciate the cogency of the arguments to follow.
3
For more on this point, see Chris L. Firestone, “Making Sense Out of Tradition: Theology and Conflict in Kant’s Philosophy of Religion,” in Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion, ed. Chris L. Firestone and Stephen R. Palmquist (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 2006), 152.
4
Chris L. Firestone, Kant and Theology at the Boundaries at the Boundaries of Reason (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishers Ltd., 2009), chap. 7.
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One final comment is in order. We contend in IDKR that “Defending
the internal coherence of Religion from an expository vantage point and
commending its desirability for Christianity are two entirely different
matters, and we will, in this volume, focus exclusively on the former”
(IDKR, 6). If I had to put my finger on it, I would say that the tension in
Michalson’s critical essay between endorsing our interpretation and being
resolute in his new pathway of not defending the text is due to imputing
his own interpretive strategy to the authors of IDKR. Part One obscures
Part Two of our book for Michalson because he assumes, first, that covert
interpretive motivations exist in our authorial consciousness and, second,
that these motivations steer our inquiries. The latter we deny outright,
while the former is an argument from silence—a silence we happily break
in order to make clear that no such motivations are at work in IDKR.
George di Giovanni
Di Giovanni apparently agrees with IDKR on many key points. He agrees
that Religion is consistent with Kant’s critical system and that the critical
system requires Religion “in order that it attains closure precisely as a
system” (164). Kant’s Religion, he writes, “is required to resolve, but only
subjectively, what otherwise would be an absurdum practicum. The early
Wood and Ward said as much; so do the authors of the present book, and,
if I remember correctly, so did David Strauss” (167). Despite these significant similarities in our respective understandings, di Giovanni takes
there to be a fundamental difference between us and him that makes the
prospect of ever agreeing, or even dialoguing meaningfully, hard for him
to fathom.
It seems these differences boil down to three. First, di Giovanni thinks
that the main stream of Western thought flows through Kant to the Idealists
(arriving at Fichte) and that this flow should inform how we read Kant.
Second, di Giovanni critiques the foundations of Kant’s arguments in
Religion not in terms that are of central importance to the text as such,
but in terms that point back to the critical philosophy proper. In other
words, the three Critiques, not Religion, create problems for Kant. The
critical philosophy is, according to di Giovanni, “obviously wrong . . . ,
[even though] coherently wrong” (164). Where Michalson understands
the problem to reside in Religion itself, di Giovanni takes the problem to
reside in the first Critique. The result for both, however, is an interpretive
movement away from Kant’s philosophy and towards Kant’s context and
influence. The third problem pertains to what di Giovanni perceives as
dissonance between the first half of the first Critique (what atheist and
agnostic interpreters take to be Kant’s “good philosophy”) and the core
doctrines of rational religious faith found in their rudimentary form in
the second half of the first Critique and more robustly in Religion. The former is supposedly anti-metaphysical and the latter drinks deeply from
the wellsprings of Kant’s decidedly Christian place in intellectual and
geographic history.
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Di Giovanni makes the observation that our interpretation has historical precursors in the Jena school of theology and especially Karl Leonhard
Reinhold. While we do think that Kant’s philosophy of religion is more
theologically affirmative than is commonly thought, I would caution that
Reinhold and his followers go far beyond what Jacobs and I would ever suggest. Reinhold so believed in the cogency of Kant’s position on Christianity
that he tried “to persuade the public to become entirely Kantian. . . . That,
he says, is the final solution to the doubts and disputes of the centuries, and
the reconciliation of the head and heart of man.”5 The only interpreter I
have read in recent years who fits into the Jena mold is Stephen Palmquist.
I would turn di Giovanni’s attention, for example, to Palmquist’s contribution to Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion (KNPR). There, Palmquist
recommends that Kantian philosophers “join and support a religious group
that conforms as closely as possible to Kant’s ideal.”6 By infiltrating churches, “The philosopher who attends can encourage the group to follow a more
rational, enlightened course.”7 He goes on to advocate that some may even
become priests in order to carry out their work professionally and proficiently. This is so far removed from the position of Firestone and Jacobs that
no resemblance can be reasonably maintained.
Nevertheless, di Giovanni is confident that our reading of Religion relates to at least the myth perpetuated by the Jena school. The myth is that
“once critical ignorance is admitted at the level of theory, because of the
subjective interests of reason, all past dogmatic metaphysics can be reincorporated, as if from the back door, under the rubric of ‘moral faith’”
(167–168). Given the direction of the Jena school, I can understand why
di Giovanni worries. This worry, however, does not excuse the hasty generalization the myth represents. For Kant, “critical ignorance” cuts both
ways. From the point of view of Kant on knowledge, we cannot determine definitively whether or not God exists. Neither theism nor atheism
presents us with sufficient theoretical grounds for belief or non-belief. But
because theoretical reason allows us to get God in mind by furnishing us
with a concept of God that, as Andrew Chignell puts it, enables reason
“to avoid the abyss” (see my response to Anderson’s essay below), we are
able to make a transition to the moral, aesthetic, and teleological dimensions of reason for a more thoroughgoing determination of the matter.
Understood in this way, the logic behind Kant’s development of transcendental theology is really not all that hard to see. Addressing the perennial
questions of duty, hope and identity decisively tips the scales in favor of
belief in God. As is well known, Kant denied knowledge to make room
for faith. What has been hard for interpreters of Kant to see, prior to IDKR,
5
Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism, ed. Dieter Henrich and David S.
Pacini (Harvard: President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2003), 123.
6
Stephen R. Palmquist, “Philosophers in the Public Square: A Religious Resolution to
Kant’s Conflict of the Faculties,” in Firestone and Palmquist, Kant and the New Philosophy of
Religion, 243.
7
Palmquist, “Philosophers in the Public Square,” 244.
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was just where this room for faith is and what finally inhabits it in terms
of coherent, critical content. Di Giovanni, though he does not like this
outcome, grants that Kant’s writings leave the door open for this method
of interpretation.
Putting aside the straw-man linking of our interpretation to the Jena
school, di Giovanni appeals to two additional factors that he takes to militate against understanding Kant’s philosophy of religion as we do, namely,
“the historical context” in which di Giovanni places Kant’s critical system
and what he calls “the spirit in which Kant was re-introducing in the critical system the tropes of a past theology” (168). Di Giovanni’s criticism of
IDKR on these two points is difficult to refute in any direct way. For when
one holds that the proper interpretation of a text is constituted not only
by meta-considerations that go well beyond the immediate context, but
also by the requirement that other arguments in other texts be coherent,
the waters quickly become muddied. The most pertinent connection I see
between Kant’s understanding of the self and Religion is a very positive
one. There is, as Søren Kierkegaard once noted, a deep-seated honesty in
the later Kant—one that finally makes good on his notion of wisdom by
venturing deep into the “hell of self-cognition” (6:441). Although agreeing
with our basic findings, namely, that Religion is a coherent work of philosophy and that many places in Kant’s writings could be used to support our
reading, di Giovanni understands the interpretive task very differently.
His challenge is based not on textual coherence but rather on arguments
against Kant’s overall philosophical cogency. In this sense, he really is not
criticizing IDKR at all. Kant’s arguments in Religion, thinks di Giovanni,
are not to be taken at face value, but read as tropes of past Western, indeed
Christian, thought. He asks us to believe that Kant applies them merely as
a psychological salve to the end of his philosophy to help heal the wounds
opened by its “real” entailments as he sees them and the perceived need
to deal with these intellectual remnants.
The crux of di Giovanni’s argument thus boils down to two points: (1)
Kant’s critical philosophy has a flawed understanding of the self and any
inferences to rational religious faith based on it must also be flawed, and
(2) Kant was not the kind of man who could have meant what he wrote
in Religion. Both of these claims, however, are defended only by the same
thin arguments that have been staples of the traditional interpretation in
Kant-studies for the last half century. Rather than allowing the text the
opportunity to speak for itself, traditional interpreters continue to read
special, extra-textual considerations into Kant’s Religion as if these considerations were constitutive hermeneutic principles. As I point out in KNPR,
the “new wave” in Kant-studies is less focused on Kant’s personality and
political context, and more concerned with explicating the philosophical
entailments of Kant’s arguments.8 When you focus on Kant-the-Person
8
Firestone, “Making Sense Out of Tradition,” 141–142. Keith Yandell coins the terms
“New Wave” and “New Wavers” in his essay “Who is the True Kant?”
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or Kant-the-Politician in order to understand Religion, its arguments can
become distorted and look forced. They appear to be either lacking in
coherence or dismissible on extra-textual grounds. Approaching Religion
from the point of view of Kant-the-Philosopher, however, makes Kant’s
arguments more intelligible and less easy to dismiss, as the interpretive
advancements of IDKR show.
Perhaps the real problem stems from the fact that Kant scholars are
typically uninterested in theology and do not know enough about it to
make sense out of Kant’s arguments in Religion. The theology I have in
mind here is the philosophical theology of medieval Christianity. Rationalists from Leibniz to Wolff had a better grasp of this sort of theology
than Kant interpreters today. What has confounded interpreters of Kant
for years is that Kant’s turn to the topic of religion in his late critical period draws on the rich history of Western, distinctly-Christian thought
from this period, rather than working polemically against it. The myth of
Kant as the metaphysical all-destroyer rests deep in the psyche of many
traditional Kant scholars. Employing more theologically informed lenses
when reading Kant helps us to see the theological movement from the
first Critique to Religion as an unfolding and deepening, rather than as a
philosophical misstep. Once Kant leaves purely moral concerns in the second Critique and addresses the question of human nature in Book One of
Religion, he once again turns explicitly to theological concerns of the day.
The conclusion that humanity has a corrupt moral disposition in Book
One of Religion is the problem, and the wealth of theological resources
proffered by his predecessors provides Kant in Book Two with a template
for its solution.
Kant’s clear emphasis in Religion on distinctly theological resources is
the principal reason why I turned to Nathan Jacobs some eight years ago
to co-write IDKR. His expertise as a theologian helped me understand the
logic behind Kant’s arguments in Religion and thereby address the many
conundrums of Religion scattered in the secondary literature. We live in an
age of academic specialization and it is not surprising that many philosophers today know far less theology than most philosophers in the time of
Kant. Di Giovanni, early on in his critique of IDKR, offers a personal testimony about his theological convictions that I think is helpful to mention
here: “I have no religious orthodox agenda to promote. I profess no religion. . . . If pressed, I would declare myself a Christian atheist” (164–165).
In other words, di Giovanni is a self-avowed Christian in terms of formal
ethics and an atheist in terms of metaphysics. One wonders, in the light
of this testimony, if Kant’s arguments of the latter half of the first Critique,
extending onward to Religion, fail for di Giovanni simply because he is not
interested in them, does not know or care to know them, or simply does
not like their theological conclusions. Considering his comments carefully, what becomes clear is just how closely di Giovanni’s interpretation
of Kant resembles his own confessed position and how far removed it is
from Kant’s published position.
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Di Giovanni thinks Kant’s arguments are not guilty because they do
not mean what they appear to mean. He happily admits that IDKR shows
the text to be coherent and, in this sense, IDKR makes a valuable contribution to the literature. But, for di Giovanni, Religion cannot be thought of
as a literary classic and a valuable contribution to philosophy of religion.
At best, it is a transcendental language game that neither extends Kant’s
system of thought nor posits a distinct methodology for philosophical and
theological engagement. Kant’s arguments in Religion are merely misdirected tropes of past theologies that are undercut by Kant’s wrongheaded
philosophy of the self. My position is that, if di Giovanni wants to assert
that the best secondary literature on Kant’s Religion is really missing the
point and thus that the indictment we outline in the first half of IDKR is
somehow wrongheaded, then he should make clear his understanding of
the state of the question. I, for one, would be delighted to see this in print.
Perhaps it already is and I am unaware of it. Either way, we will have to
agree to take up this matter at a later date.
Pamela Sue Anderson
Since the publication of P. F. Strawson’s The Bounds of Sense (1966), Kantstudies has leaned in the direction of hyper-empiricism. The only things
Kant’s philosophy allows us to get in mind, think Strawsonians, are syntheses of concepts and intuitions in immediate experience by an act of
judgment or compounded combinations of these judgments. This Kantas-logical-positivist-rather-than-transcendental-rationalist approach has
enabled the roots of anti-metaphysical readings of Kant to grow deeply
into the soil of Kant reception in the latter half of the twentieth century.
This approach has contributed much to what the editors of KNPR call the
“traditional interpretation” of Kant. The traditional interpretation is characterized by a strict boundary line between known and unknown and
the relegation of all theological statements to mere formal postulations of
the moral philosophy. The traditional interpretation is pessimistic about
the viability of God-talk independent of moral concerns and therefore
also pessimistic about Religion as a significant contributor to Kant’s critical philosophy. This interpretation of Kant became “the largest unified
minority report” on how to interpret Kant’s philosophy of religion in the
twentieth century.9 In a forthcoming essay, I argue that this interpretation
ultimately promotes non-realist interpretations of Kant on God and religious faith and is traceable to distinctly British interpretive innovations
far removed from the actual nature of Kant’s philosophical program.10
I mention this as background to my rejoinder to Anderson’s essay in
view of the way she goes about critiquing IDKR. It seems to me that the
9
See “Editors’ Introduction,” in Firestone and Palmquist, Kant and the New Philosophy of
Religion.
10
Chris L. Firestone, “The Illegitimate Son: Kant and Theological Non-Realism” in The
Persistence of the Sacred in Modern Thought, ed. Chris L. Firestone and Nathan A. Jacobs
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012), chap. 10.
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essence of her two main criticisms are the same and traceable to a common source. Just as Peter Byrne, Don Cupitt and Keith Ward understand
Kant’s philosophy in strongly empiricist terms—namely, that without
knowledge of God, faith in God requiring knowledge of the existence of
God is impossible—so too does Anderson.11 For Anderson, belief in God
is possible for Kant, but only belief in the idea of God as a “moral postulate.” By moral postulate, she means merely a non-real, nominal term
that only makes sense insofar as it makes free obedience to the moral law
rationally viable.
Needless to say, Jacobs and I understand Kant’s philosophy and its
proper reception in the history of Western thought very differently than
its more empirically-minded interpreters. One thing we think that Anderson fails to take into account is that, for Kant, bare reason participates
in being itself. The rationalists before Kant and the idealists after him
understood this point. The orders of being and knowing, for those of the
continental rationalist tradition, are not distinct; rather they are logically
co-dependent, though they differ in how we may think about them. In
this sense, the transcendental boundaries of reason have a kind of thickness for Kant that Anderson, in emphasizing Kant’s debt to empiricism,
fails to acknowledge and appreciate. This is evidenced not only in her two
basic criticisms of IDKR, which we will examine momentarily, but also in
her position that human reason, for Kant, “cannot grasp perfection” (5).
This claim, of course, is in tension with Kant’s adherence to a basically
traditional and rationalistic conception of God and seems to me to be in
outright contradiction with Anderson’s admission that Kant employs the
idea of “the original being” in his theoretical philosophy.12 Kant, of course,
goes much further than merely referring to God as “the original being”
in the first Critique; he also refers to God as the “highest being” (A578/
B606), the “being of all beings” (A578/B606), the “highest reality” (A579/
B607), the “necessary all-sufficient original being” (A621/B649), and “a
being having all reality” (A631/B659). What is this being, for Kant, other
than a reference to the perfect being theology of the continental rationalist
tradition extending back into pre-Modernity? In IDKR, we trace key aspects of Kant’s rational theology back through Wolff and Leibniz to John
Duns Scotus and his doctrine of univocity.13 Anderson does not interact
with this material, preferring to focus on the first half of the first Critique
instead and to provide an empirically-driven account of Kant, so it is difficult to know what she thinks about it.
11
See Peter Byrne, “Kant’s Moral Proof for the Existence of God,” Scottish Journal of Theology 32 (1982), 333–343; Don Cupitt, “Kant and the Negative Theology,” in The Philosophical
Frontiers of Christian Theology: Essays Presented to D. M. MacKinnon, ed. Brian Hebblethwaite
and Stewart Sutherland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 55–67; and Keith
Ward, The Development of Kant’s View of Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972).
12
On Kant’s basic adherence to rationalist theology, see Allen Wood, Kant’s Rational Theology (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), 150–151.
13
In Defense of Kant’s Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 159–163.
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Be this as it may, Anderson does level two criticisms of IDKR in support of her position. Her first criticism focuses on the distinction we make
between cognition (Erkenntnis) and knowledge (Wissen). Following Kant’s
Lectures on Metaphysics, we highlight this distinction in chapter 4 of IDKR
and use it to set the stage for our interpretation of Religion in the succeeding chapters. Anderson suggests this distinction is out of step with
Kant’s critical philosophy proper. Her position, like that of Byrne, Cupitt
and Ward, holds that cognition is not only synonymous with knowledge
(which, as an isolated claim, we likewise affirm), but also exhaustively synonymous with knowledge. According to Anderson, Erkenntnis and Wissen
are (or must be) identical for Kant in every case. The second criticism is
closely related to the first, but zeros in on pure cognition as supposedly a
type of knowledge or “coming to know.” If we are really using the notion
of pure cognition to mean “coming to know” (rather than, as we claim
in IDKR, a potential source of rational faith), then IDKR illegitimately
expands the boundaries of knowledge so that they include a veritable pantheon of transcendental ideas as possible objects of knowledge. If this is
indeed part of our interpretation, then it is clearly out of step with Kant’s
theoretical strictures.
The first criticism is not surprising to us insofar as we make a point
in IDKR to show that Kant’s interpreters, particularly interpreters of
Kant’s philosophy of religion, regularly and incorrectly assumed that
Wissen and Erkenntnis are, in all cases, synonymous for Kant. We are not
the first Kant interpreters to make this point. Rolf Georg awakened us
to the issue in his essay “Vorstellung and Erkenntnis in Kant.”14 Perhaps
no single misstep has muddied the waters of the secondary literature on
Kant’s philosophy of religion more than this false identification of meaning. Kant can and does get God in mind and this idea is not reducible
to compound combinations of empirical cognitions. Kant warns against
such anthropomorphic notions of God in many places in his writings.
In IDKR, capitalizing on the work of Allen Wood, we point out that central to Kant’s transcendental theology of the first Critique is the concept
of the ens realissimum (i.e., God the all-reality or the sum of all possible
predication).15 Kant readily adopts this fairly common rationalist conception of God in his theoretical philosophy and then develops it in his
subsequent writings. To show how this development is possible, we turn
in IDKR to Kant’s Lectures on Metaphysics. There, Kant argues that cognition has two variants—empirical cognition, which is synonymous with
knowledge (Wissen), and pure cognition, which simply means to get something in mind. As a transcendental rationalist, Kant thinks it perfectly fine
14
Rolf George, “Vorstellung and Erkenntnis in Kant,” in Interpreting Kant, ed. Moltke S.
Gram (Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press, 1982). See our discussion of his work in In
Defense of Kant’s Religion, chap. 4.
15
See the section entitled “Witness for the Defense: Allen W. Wood” in In Defense of
Kant’s Religion, 36–45; and Allen Wood, Kant’s Rational Religion (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1978).

RESPONSE TO CRITICS OF IN DEFENSE OF KANT’S RELIGION

205

to think a robust class of ideas or abstractions for which there are no possible corresponding intuitions via the senses. Instead, they are possible
objects of rational faith.
Anderson seems concerned that Kant’s distinction between pure
and empirical cognition is impossible to sustain in that it does not obey
Kant’s strictures on knowledge. It is hard to know what to say here. On
Anderson’s reading, Kant is not really a rationalist thinker at all. That is,
she seems to believe that Kant does not agree with Descartes, Leibniz,
or Wolff, or even with his esteemed teacher Martin Knutzen, in holding
that we can think perfection, that we can get God in mind, and that these
ideas are aspects of our mental noetic superstructure with genuine ontological significance. According to IDKR, what is most interesting about
Kant’s transcendental rationalism is not that we can think God (this, to
our minds, should be uncontroversial), but that, by making a transition of
critical focus to other transcendental dimensions of reason, God becomes
the centerpiece of more doctrines of rational religious faith (i.e., human
depravity, prototypical redemption, and the Ethical Commonwealth).16
Because Anderson’s Kant is a logical positivist, Kant’s philosophy must
remain infinitely far removed from this sort of interpretation. Not
only can’t humans have an immediate intuition of God via the senses
(which is a position every Kant interpreter affirms), but also humans, it
seems, can’t even manage to think God in any kind of traditional rationalistic sense.
C. Stephen Evans is helpful here. According to Evans, Kant is fully
aware that theoretical reason has to supply the idea of God for rational
faith to be developed in accord with the subjective dimension of the critical philosophy.17 Echoing Kant’s distinction between pure cognition and
empirical cognition, Evans affirms that “Kant certainly held that the field
of the thinkable is broader than the knowable, and even broader than the
conceivable in that narrow sense in which the conceivable means the possibly knowable.”18 Although no knowledge (empirical cognition) of God is
possible, we can think (pure cognition) God and raise relevant questions
about the universe that demand appeal to and indeed belief in God for
their resolution. Andrew Chignell makes an additional clarification regarding the relationship between thought and belief in Kant’s philosophy
that brings the discussion into sharp relief. According to Chignell, belief is
a type of assent for Kant that can be either empirical or rational. I can think
of anything I like, but in order to have a belief I need sufficient empirical or
rational reasons for it. Chignell, like Evans, Wood, Firestone, and Jacobs,
points to Kant’s understanding of the ens realissimum conception of God
in the first Critique as an example of a theoretical belief. “This assent, too,
See In Defense of Kant’s Religion, chaps. 5–7.
C. Stephen Evans, Subjectivity and Religious Belief: An Historical, Critical Study (Grand
Rapids: Eerdman’s Publishing Co., 1978), 19.
18
Ibid., 23.
16
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is a result of the rational need for completeness or a sufficient reason—the
need to avoid the abyss.”19
Anderson’s reading runs contrary to all of these interpretations of Kant’s
rational theology. In her empiricist-styled approach, thoughts are reducible
to sense perception in an eliminative sense. Ideas that are not traceable to
particular sense perceptions, even such basic ideas as God, freedom, and
immortality, are never really complete thoughts of reason and therefore
cannot be thought of as existing in reality or as possible objects of rational
faith. For her, transcendental ideas are merely names that reason posits in
support of human moral striving for the highest good. Her interpretation
in this sense stands in sharp contrast with Kant’s philosophical heritage
and makes almost no sense of the immense amount of textual data in support of a more rationalistic understanding of Kant on God.
Anderson’s second criticism of IDKR is that we equate pure cognition
with something akin to a lesser form of knowledge or what she terms
a “coming to know” (1–2). If pure cognition is a form of knowledge in
any sense, then it is reducible to empirical cognition and no pure cognition of God would thus be possible. In attributing this position to us, she
assumes that we are making the same mistake made by Don Wiebe.20
Wiebe argued that rational faith, for Kant, in some modest way expands
our knowledge. In chapter 4 of IDKR, we show how Wiebe misrepresented
Kant on this point. Although on the right track, Wiebe did not understand
that rational faith in God is not in any sense a species of knowledge, but
rather a purely cognized conviction of reason alone.21 The problem with
Anderson’s characterization of our position is that it completely misses
the purely rational nature of “pure” cognition. Kant is, as I have already
stated, a fairly traditional rationalist on this point. As an interpreter of
Kant, it is incumbent upon Anderson not to read into Kant an empiricist’s
or positivist’s methodology, or any other for that matter, but to track with
Kant and seek to understand God, man and world the way he did.
Stephen R. Palmquist
According to Philip Rossi, Kant scholars often see in Kant their own theological position rather than Kant’s.22 This is true for both theological interpreters of Kant and a-theological interpreters of Kant, and is why IDKR
sticks so closely to the text rather than meta-considerations. As much as
interpreters are tempted to find something of themselves in Kant, they
must try to resist this urge. IDKR devotes itself to interpreting Kant’s Religion in a close textual sense in order to minimize this inevitability. Jacobs’s
Andrew Chignell, “Belief in Kant,” Philosophical Review 116:3 (2007), 327.
Don Wiebe, “The Ambiguous Revolution: Kant on the Nature of Faith,” Scottish Journal
of Theology 33 (1983).
21
Firestone and Jacobs, In Defense of Kant’s Religion, 108.
22
Philip J. Rossi, “Reading Kant through Theological Spectacles” in Firestone and
Palmquist, Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion, 107–123.
19
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response captures the exegetical emphasis of IDKR and shows just how
far IDKR actually is from the authors’ own positions. This point is salient
as we examine Palmquist’s comments on IDKR.
Palmquist’s criticism of IDKR focuses on (1) the supposed claim that
IDKR is the first linear, holistic reading of Religion on the market, and
(2) the perceived inaccuracy of our understanding of Kant’s two experiments. I will not spend a lot of time on the first claim because I honestly
do not know to what it refers. We use the term “linear” only once in
the book, on the third to last page. There, we contrast our reading with
many others in the field that, when staking a unique position on the text’s
meaning, often focus on one or another of the four Books of Religion while
downplaying the others. We write, “By contrast, we have argued that
Kant’s Religion is equally amenable, and perhaps more so, to a holistic and
linear interpretation” (IDKR, 233). We do not claim that the linear nature
of our interpretation is what makes IDKR unique; there are other interpretations out there that, to a greater or lesser degree, attempt to read the
text linearly. What makes IDKR unique is its ability to handle the various
conundrums found in the field of Kant-studies over the last twenty-five
years in the process of reading it linearly. Palmquist’s interpretation may
be an example of a linear read—I really am not sure on this point. What I
am sure of is that his interpretation does not handle the conundrums in
Kant’s Religion, which is the sole purpose of IDKR.
The second criticism is more interesting. Palmquist argues that Kant’s
two experiments are neither where Hare and Reardon take them to be
nor where Firestone and Jacobs take them to be. According to Hare and
Reardon, the first experiment is made up of Kant’s moral writings (viz.,
Groundwork and Critique Practical Reason) and the second experiment is
Religion as a whole. We call this understanding of the two experiments the
“Religion-as-translation” interpretation. Kant takes Christianity and, in
Religion, translates it into a religious version of Kant’s moral philosophy.
Firestone and Jacobs, on the other hand, understand both experiments to
take place in Religion—the first experiment in the first three Books and the
second experiment in Book Four. If I understand Palmquist’s comments
correctly, he thinks the best reading of Religion is somewhere between
these two positions. Like the Religion-as-translation interpretation, the
two experiments do involve the translation of Christian truth claims into
terms amenable to the transcendental philosophy (i.e., the prototype is
Jesus in moral terms for Palmquist). However, like the Firestone and
Jacobs interpretation, both experiments are conducted in Religion.
Palmquist submits that his position is explained in detail in Kant’s Critical Religion and IDKR ignores these arguments. One needs to remember
that our expressed hermeneutic strategy in IDKR is focused principally
on textual data in Religion in the context of the conundrums forwarded
in the secondary literature. Without hair-splitting over the fairly complex
and often-difficult-to-understand details of Palmquist’s interpretation, I
will simply say that we found Hare’s and Reardon’s interpretation and
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application of the experiments to have significant explanatory power over
the conundrums in Religion, while Palmquist’s did not. If I may be permitted to speculate for a moment, the reason why Palmquist’s interpretation
of the two experiments does not handle the conundrums in Religion very
well may be due to the fact that Kant’s Critical Religion does not address
a single one of them. One could read virtually all of Palmquist’s work
prior to IDKR and be totally unaware that any of the litany of problems
noted in chapter 3 of IDKR exists in the secondary literature! This is a
significant lacuna in Palmquist’s work on Kant. Palmquist’s claim that we
“make little effort to rebut previously published evidence contradicting
their position” (175) sounds truly remarkable, given what we find or, more
exactly, what we do not find in his own published writings.
Were this not enough, Palmquist goes on to challenge our reading of
the two experiments by claiming that we “miss a golden opportunity” by
“remain[ing] silent about whether or not such a reading exists” (176). This
kind of interpretive criticism strikes me as overly optimistic in reference
to Palmquist’s own work. Whenever we considered one of the very difficult conundrums forwarded by Kant’s critics and consulted Palmquist’s
writings with a view to resolving it, we were left either in silence or with a
quotation of Kant—which only begs the question of what the text actually
means. We thus decided to focus on what we perceived to be Palmquist’s
more lasting contributions to the field, namely, Kant’s relationship to
Emmanuel Swedenborg, the connection between Kant’s pre-critical writings and early critical writings, and the affirmative implications of Kant’s
philosophy for metaphysics.
Beyond the fact that Palmquist’s published writings never handle the
conundrums in Religion, another problem for bringing his interpretation
further into the discussion has to do with the fact that it is couched in a
perspectival reading of Kant’s philosophy. This interpretation is found
in an abbreviated form in Kant’s Critical Religion, but is spelled out in
detail in Palmquist’s Kant’s System of Perspectives. Palmquist’s self-titled
“perspectival interpretation” brings structural clarity and integrity to the
superstructure of Kant’s philosophy, which he then applies to Religion.
However, Palmquist admits that his interpretive method goes beyond
what the author explicitly contends in order “to construct a systematic
interpretation, even if the original writer was not always so clear and
consistent.”23 Problems with this method of interpretation have not
gone unnoticed. Jennifer McRobert notes this and questions “whether
[Palmquist’s] book is intended as an exposition of or as a redeployment
of the critical philosophy.”24 To this, Palmquist replies, “The answer, quite
simply, is both! The best ‘interpretation,’ I believe, consists of both exegesis
23
Stephen R. Palmquist, Kant’s System of Perspectives: An Architectonic Interpretation of the
Critical Philosophy (Lanham: University Press of America, 1993), 9–10.
24
Jennifer McRobert, “Review of Kant’s System of Perspectives,” Canadian Philosophical
Reviews 14:2 (April 1994), 119–121.
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and eisegesis. The two factors are complementary, not mutually exclusive:
exegesis without eisegesis is like a dead corpse; eisegesis without exegesis
is like a disembodied spirit.”25 Palmquist’s work, under these definitions,
is neither a dead corpse nor a disembodied spirit, but what it is is open to
interpretation.
In this light, I do not think that Palmquist’s writings can be treated as
if they are purely exegetical treatments of Kant. Palmquist’s writings on
Religion (and other works by Kant) make an awkward demand of interpreters: In order to understand this text well, you must first master Palmquist and
then discern where Kant ends and Palmquist begins. With regard to the aim of
IDKR (i.e., showing Religion to contain coherent arguments free from the
conundrums thought to be contained in it), we found Palmquist’s blend of
exegetical and eisegetical insights to be helpful neither in explicating the
specific meaning of the passage or passages in question nor in addressing
the difficulties repeatedly noted by Kant’s critics. We thus chose to focus
on more overtly exegetical authors.
In chapters 7 and 8 of Kant’s Critical Religion, Palmquist unpacks Kant’s
two experiments as they emerge out of his wider interpretation of Kant’s
philosophy. He is not arguing on the backdrop of alternative understandings of the text, but merely presenting a view of the experiments as
examples of his perspectival interpretation applied to Religion. In this light,
there really cannot be any competitors to his view. None of them can ever
get off the ground on his reading because they must first pass muster by
being run through the sieve of Palmquist’s perspectival interpretation. His
criticism that IDKR does not cite his reading of the two experiments thus
depends on someone having done the work of applying this reading to the
ongoing discussion. This, as far as I know, has not happened. I am glad
Palmquist does some of this work in his contribution to this symposium,
but we cannot be held responsible for interacting with material that did
not at the time exist.
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